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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a common agency model to analyze the strategic interaction between govern-
ments in regulating “dirty” multinational …rms. These …rms possess private information about the
degree of pollution associated with their production technologies. The study shows that the strategic
behavior between non-cooperative governments, as a result of asymmetric information, works against
the “pollution haven” hypothesis. The paper highlights the importance of factors that can dominate
environmental costs in a government’s welfare maximization decision rather than those in a …rm’s pro…t
maximization decision. The paper also draw implications on the empirical studies of the “pollution
haven” hypothesis.
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Since countries with low environmental standards can gain a comparative cost advantage in the
international commodity market, the “pollution haven” hypothesis suggests that foreign investors will
‡ock to poorer countries to take advantage of their lax environmental standards. It has long been
debated whether this fear is a legitimate concern in terms of preserving the global environment. This
paper puts aside whether di¤erent environment standards would damage the global environment, but
focuses on whether governments would set di¤erent environmental standards that would contribute to
the “pollution haven” hypothesis. This naturally leads to the question how “dirty” multinational …rms
locate their production.
The “pollution haven” hypothesis is based on a simple intuition that people in a poorer country
would have a lower marginal valuation on the environment (or a lower marginal disutility of pollution)
and hence a lower marginal social cost of production.1 To maximize social welfare, the government
in a poorer country would set lower environment taxes or standards, which would result in a lower
production cost. This would attract multinationals to reallocate their production from a richer country
to a poorer country to minimize their marginal costs of production.
Not surprisingly, when we take into consideration the marginal private costs other than pollution
taxes, the “pollution haven” hypothesis will break down. However, some empirical results show that
the “pollution haven” hypothesis does not hold even after controlling for factors that can dominate
environmental costs in a …rm’s pro…t optimization decision, such as transportation costs, factor costs,
economies of scale, country risks, etc. For an example, Eskeland and Harrison (1997) show that there is
almost no evidence that investors in developed countries ‡ee environmental costs at home after they have
controlled in their regressions for the openness of an economy, industrial concentration, the domestic
regulatory environment, factor endowments, and wages in the hosting country.
If we have controlled for the major factors that work against the “pollution haven” hypothesis,
we should be able to observe “pollution havens,” and furthermore, we would be able to estimate the
1Empirical studies on the relationship between pollution and income growth, which a¤ects one’s marginal disutility
of pollution, include Grossman and Krueger (1995), Komen et al. (1997), Selden and Song (1994), and the World Bank
(1992).
1contribution of each of these factors in making the “pollution haven” hypothesis invalid. If one or more
of these factors are at work in a particular sector or country, we can be sure that there will be no
“pollution havens,” and we can put our minds to rest. Thus, the puzzle here is what else is missing
besides the above factors.
To solve this puzzle, this paper turns attention to the role of governments instead of private …rms
and argues that the strategic behavior between non-cooperative governments changes the marginal
social cost of production. This change a¤ects a multinational …rm’s production allocation and works
against the “pollution haven” hypothesis, but is ignored in most of the empirical tests of the “pollution
haven” hypothesis. The model developed in this paper assumes two governments and a continuum of
multinational …rms. Pollution generated by the …rms can be transboundary.
From a government’s point of view, the simple intuition of the “pollution haven” hypothesis becomes
more complicated once a government observes neither a …rm’s pollution level nor a …rm’s production
technology that relates output to pollution. Although there have been many improvements in measuring
pollution directly and accurately with reasonable costs, this asymmetric information is still the main
obstacle in regulating pollution and is especially so when there are multinational …rms.
First, since each competitive multinational …rm can have a di¤erent production technology with
which its production pollutes, there is no one-to-one relationship between output and pollution. The
relationship depends on the technology used. If a government simply imposes a uniform output tax on
all …rms, then for a given output, a …rm with a dirtier technology would pay the same tax as a …rm
with a cleaner technology though the “dirtier” …rm emits more pollution and causes more damage to
the environment. A welfare improving environmental policy requires governments to levy a higher tax
on …rms with a dirtier technology than on those with a cleaner technology. Thus, each government has
to design a mechanism with which to induce …rms to reveal their true production technologies.
Second, the existence of multinationals and transboundary pollution greatly complicates the above
asymmetric information problem under non-cooperative governments. In the absence of multinational
…rms and transboundary pollution, asymmetric information is only a national problem. The degree to
which a …rm’s production technology pollutes is only important to the local government. To regulate a
“dirty” multinational …rm, both the home and host governments have to know the …rm’s true production
2technology so as to implement an appropriate tax policy, even when pollution does not cross national
boundaries. This leads to a common agency problem with governments as principals and multinational
…rms as comment agents.
Third, the above common agency problem creates strategic interaction between governments in their
individual attempts to obtain information about a …rm’s production technology at the lowest possible
cost. An information rent is paid to …rms in terms of retained after-tax pro…ts. Under asymmetric
information, a …rm must keep a minimum positive after-tax pro…t so as to be willing to reveal its true
technology. Each government has an incentive to collect more taxes from a …rm by increasing local pro-
duction and forcing the other government to contribute more to meet a …rm’s minimum retained pro…t
requirement. Thus, the attempt to minimize information rent payment provides both governments an
incentive to increase local production so as to squeeze the tax revenue collected by the other government.
The following analysis shows that this rent extraction behavior is more e¤ective and thus production
increases more in the developed countries with higher environmental standards than in the developing
countries with lower environmental standards. This can cause the “pollution haven” hypothesis to break
down.
Hoel (1991, 1997), Dockner and Long (1993), Folmer et al. (1993), and Markusen, Morey and
Olewiler (1995) also focuses on how governments would strategically a¤ect …rms’ production allocation,
but their studies are all based on full information so that governments can extract all pro…ts. Hoel
(1991,1997), Dockner and Long (1993), and Folmer et al. (1993) study the case of transboundary
pollution for local …rms. Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1995) leave out transboundary pollution and
focus on the competition between governments in levying environmental taxes on multinational …rms.
The competition for additional tax revenues, which is their governments’ major trade-o¤ against the
disutility of added pollution, is in terms of monopoly pro…ts rather than information rents as in this
paper.
In the common agency literature, Bernheim and Whinston (1985, 1986), La¤ont and Tirole (1991),
Martimort (1992), and Stole (1992) extend the bilateral principal-agent model with moral hazard of
Holmstrom (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983), and are the …rst to introduce the common agency
problem with two uninformed principals and one common agent with either private information or
3unobservable action.2 In their models as in this paper, the two principals have the same information
set and the agent’s type a¤ects the principals in the same way. Many studies have generalized this
homogeneity assumption, for examples, Bond and Gresik (1997) study the case where there is one
informed and one uninformed government rather than two uninformed governments, while Biglaiser
and Mezzetti (1993) and Mezzetti (1997) extend their study from homogeneous principals to vertically
and horizontally di¤erentiated principals, respectively. Other extensions include Gal-Or (1991), Ivaldi
and Martimort (1994), Martimort (1996), and Bond and Gresik (1996).
In applying the common agency model to analyzing the “pollution haven” hypothesis, the model
developed in this paper makes the following extensions to Stole (1992).3 First, the model developed
in this paper allows each government’s utility to be determined not only by a multinational …rm’s
production in the home country, but also by its production in the host country as well as by its production
technologies both in the home and the host countries. Second, this paper proves the existence of a non-
cooperative (incentive compatible) equilibrium when a multinational …rm’s productions are substitutes
and symmetric in its pro…t function. Third, this study extends the analysis from an intrinsic common
agent to a continuum of delegated common agents so that each multinational …rm can choose to produce
in either one of or both of the countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model structure. Section
3 shows that cooperation leads to the …rst best equilibrium outcome even with asymmetric informa-
tion. Section 4 demonstrates that non-cooperation and asymmetric information reinforce each other in
distorting the …rst best outcome and the “pollution haven” hypothesis. Section 4 then discusses the
possibilities of relaxing some assumptions and testing the results empirically. Section 5 concludes and
makes suggestions for future research.
2Stole (1992) has a revised version Stole (1997).
3In terms of the model structure, there is an independent work by Olsen and Osmundsen (1999a, 1999b). They applied
a similar common agency model to taxation issues. However, in their setup, there is only one …rm as the common agent
and its type does not a¤ect its cost of production. Also, in their paper, production generates no negative externalities and
governments’ pure objective is to collect tax revenue.
42 The Structure of the Model
The model includes two governments, home and foreign, and a competitive industry with a contin-
uum of …rms. The production of this competitive industry generates a negative externality either by
producing polluting by-products or by using polluting inputs. The amount of pollution is not observable
to the governments.
The product of the polluting industry is homogeneous. Its price is determined in the international
market by world demand and supply. All …rms are price takers. The total output of this “dirty” industry
in each country is only a small proportion of world production so that each government cannot a¤ect
the world price.4 To rule out the possibility of using pollution regulation to attack any other existing
distortions, such as existing taxes or monopoly power, the model assumes away tari¤s together with
any other trade barriers and the industry is assumed to be perfectly competitive. These assumptions
allow the analysis to focus on distortions resulting from non-cooperative regulation of the multinationals
under asymmetric information.
All …rms are perfectly competitive and identical except in their production technologies indexed by
µ.A… r m ’ sµ is private information. A higher µ is associated with a dirtier technology of production. It is
assumed that a …rm’s technology parameter is determined by its technology knowhow so that each …rm
only knows one technology and µ is not a …rm’s choice variable. Otherwise, if each …rm can choose from
a set of technologies and can choose di¤erent µs at home and abroad according to di¤erent regulations,
it would be a common agency problem with moral hazard rather than with adverse selection.5
This paper focuses on the adverse selection problem, which can be justi…ed if the technology of
reducing pollution is tied to human or physical assets, which are either too costly to change after a
…rm sets up its plant or is unavailable to all …rms so that each …rm inherits a unique µ.H o w e v e r ,
4The two countries can be two small neighbors, like Belgium and Holland, or can be two small countries far apart, like
Belgium and Korea.
5Some empirical studies suggest that …rms usually use the same technology across countries (Bhagwati and Hudec,
1996; Caves, 1996; Ulph, 1998). One reason is that it is more e¢cient for a …rm to specialize in one technology than to
operate under di¤erent technologies. The other reason is that, when a …rm sets up a new plant in a developing country,
the …rm tends to make its production complying to the higher environmental standards in the developed countries just to
avoid any sunk costs that can occur in the future as regulators in the developing countries tighten their requirements.
5if the …ght against pollution is a matter of a …rm’s continuous e¤ort input or if a …rm can choose its
technology after knowing the environment regulations, then it is more of a moral hazard problem than an
adverse selection problem. In general, these two problems need to be analyzed separately. Under some
circumstances, the moral hazard problem can be transformed to an adverse selection problem similar
to that discussed in this paper, using the approach in Grossman and Hart (1983). The information cost
of implementing a given e¤ort under moral hazard is then equivalent to that of enforcing truth telling
under adverse selection.
Although it is di¢cult for the home and the foreign governments to know the exact value of µ for
each individual …rm, they usually know the distribution of µ for the industry. Hence, µ becomes a
random variable for the governments. It is assumed that the industry’s technology parameter ranges
from µ to µ.L e t£=[ µ; µ] be the domain, F(µ) be the cumulative distribution function, and f(µ) be
the density function of µ. F(µ) and f(µ) are continuous and di¤erentiable with bounded derivatives.
Since regulation does not change an existing …rm’s µ, regulation does not change F(µ) and f(µ).
It is further assumed that f(µ) 6=0for all µ 2 £ so that the reciprocal of the hazard rate,
1¡F(µ)
f(µ) ,i s
de…ned for all µ 2 £. This inverse hazard rate is assumed to be nonincreasing in µ,i . e . d
dµ(
1¡F(µ)
f(µ) ) · 0
for all µ 2 £.
The total output produced by a representative …rm is denoted by Y with Y ¸ 0.L e t ’ s t a k e a





c1 ¢ Y 2 +( c2 ¢ µ + »)Y (1)
where c1 is the change of marginal cost with respect to a change of output, c2 is that with respect to a
change of technology, and » is a constant component of marginal cost. It is assumed that production
exhibits decreasing returns to scale so that c1 > 0.6 It is also assumed that there is a social welfare
trade-o¤ between cost reduction and pollution reduction so that c2 < 0.7 For the private marginal cost
to be positive for all Y and µ, » ¸¡ c2 ¢ µ>0.
6If there is constant returns to scale, i.e. c1 =0 , production in the two countries would be independent of each other
and there would be no strategic interactions between governments as shown later in the paper. If c1 < 0, there would be
increasing returns to scale resulting in an additional consideration for government regulation. To focus on the e¤ect of
pollution with asymmetric information, this case is only discussed at the end of the paper.
7Otherwise, if c2 =0 , then the governments should have the same tax scheme for all the …rms and asymmetric
6Under free trade, all …rms bid for the same inputs in both countries and have the same cost structure.
It is therefore assumed that home production (y) and foreign production (y¤) are perfect substitutes in
a …rm’s cost function so that they do not enter the total cost function individually, but only as a sum.8
Hence, the total cost of production is given by C(Y;µ) de…ned above with Y = y + y¤. This rules out
any potential reallocation of production as a result of input price di¤erentials or economies of scale,
which is already studied by Eskeland and Harrison (1997).
Let’s also take a quadratic approximation of the pollution function (Á(y;µ)) for a representative …rm




b1 ¢ y2 + b2 ¢ yµ (2)
where common wisdom suggests that b1 and b2 are both positive so that marginal pollution increases at
a constant rate as output increases and as a “dirtier” technology is used. Á(0;µ)=0for all µ,a st h e r e
is no pollution when output is zero.
To regulate pollution, a government can either use a direct mechanism, which would assign each …rm
an output level according to its reported technology parameter; or use an indirect mechanism, which
would specify a tax scheme as a function of a …rm’s output. Choosing an output is de facto equivalent
to announcing a type. The equivalence of a direct mechanism and an indirect mechanism is established
by the “taxation principle” and the “revelation principle” for a single principal case. Martimort and
Stole (1999) extends the “taxation principle” developed by Guesnerie (1981, 1995) and Rochet (1986)
to a common agency model while the extension of the “revelation principle” is not without limitations
(Martimort and Stole, 1999; Epstein and Peters, 1999).9 With this caution in mind, this paper applies
the direct mechanism approach in order to characterize the optimal outcome and hence to provide
welfare comparisons between non-cooperative and cooperative outcomes without deriving explicitly the
tax schemes that implement the optimal outcome.
i n f o r m a t i o ni sn ol o n gap r o b l e m .I fc2 > 0, then once the information is revealed, the government should only allow the
cleanliest …rm(s) to produce at their minimum e¢cient scales to achieve the desired output and shut down all the other
…rms.
8As u p e r s c r i p t¤ is used to denote all the corresponding variables in the foreign country throughout the paper.
9For an example, when the principals optimize their communications with the common agents, they can use the agents
as a collusive device so as to achieve an outcome which is not implementable under a direct mechanism. If we restrict
these communications to rule out any mixed strategies and out-of-equilibrium output and transfer o¤ers, then we may be
able to apply the revelation principle to the common agency game with caution (Martimort and Stole, 1999).
7If the governments cannot share information, then the home and the foreign governments separately
assign each …rm an output level and a transfer payment based on the …rm’s individual report of its
true technology parameter, µ.10 Such a direct mechanism can be denoted by a group of output schemes
and transfer schemes, such as {y(^ µ);y ¤(^ µ
¤
);t (^ µ);t ¤(^ µ
¤
)}, where ^ µ and ^ µ
¤
are the reported technology
parameters to the home and the foreign governments, respectively. In equilibrium, the direct mechanism
induces the …rm to reveal truthfully its technology parameter to both governments so that ^ µ = ^ µ
¤
= µ.
It is assumed that the governments o¤er the output and transfer schemes simultaneously to …rms
and …rms only have the choice of stay or exit. Firm’s outside opportunities are zero. A …rm’s objective
function is to maximize its pro…ts plus any transfers from the governments as shown in (3). Under a
direct mechanism, all …rms with the same µ have the same output and receive the same transfer.
u(y;y¤;µ)=¼(y;y¤;µ)+t(µ)+t¤(µ) (3)
where
¼(y;y¤;µ)=p ¢ (y + y¤) ¡ C(y + y¤;µ) (4)
p is the world price and is assumed to be greater than the private marginal cost of production so that
all …rms are active in the absence of regulation.
As in Copeland and Taylor (1995), it is assumed that pollution a¤ects only the level of a consumer’s
utility and plays no role in determining the consumer’s choice among goods. Thus, an indirect utility
function for a domestic representative consumer with income I and that for a foreign representative
consumer with income I¤ can be written as
V =l n I ¡ lnp ¡ °B (5)
















10Cheap talk between governments cannot convey any valuable information here, because there is an incentive for a
government and a …rm to collude on the technology parameter they would report to the other government. This incentive
is discussed in detail in section 4.
8® 2 [0;1] is the rate at which pollution is transferred from one country to the other. ° is the home
disutility per unit of pollution and °¤ is the foreign disutility per unit of pollution, and both are positive.
As in Grossman and Helpman (1994), each government’s objective is to maximize a weighted average
of consumer’s surplus, producer’s surplus and tax revenues. In the following discussion, it is assumed
that the weights assigned to consumer’s and producer’s surpluses are the same so that social welfare
is maximized. Cases of unequal weights are discussed later. It is also assumed that the shares of the
multinational …rms are sold to the citizens in the home and foreign countries only.11 The objective
functions of the home and the foreign governments are then the following:
W = V + ¯(¼ + t + t¤) ¡ t
= V + ¯¼ ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)t + ¯t¤ (9)
W¤ = V ¤ +( 1¡ ¯)(¼ + t + t¤) ¡ t¤
= V ¤ +( 1¡ ¯)¼ ¡ ¯t¤ +( 1¡ ¯)t (10)
where ¯ 2 [0;1] is the percentage of shares purchased by domestic citizens and hence is the share of a
…rm’s pro…t accruing to domestic citizens.12
The timing of the model is as follows. First, each …rm inherits a technology indexed by µ. Second,
the governments simultaneously announce their policies to all existing …rms. Under a direct mechanism,
the governments’ policies include their output schemes and either their cooperative transfer scheme, e t,
or their independent transfer schemes, t and t¤, both as functions of the technology parameter. After
learning the output and transfer schemes, all existing …rms decide where to produce and report their
technology parameters to the governments. Finally, production and transfers take place.
11This assumption can be easily relaxed. If the pro…t goes to a third country, then it a¤ects the home and the foreign
governments symmetrically. It works as if a third party levied a pro…t tax before the home and the foreign residents split
the pro…t. Such a pro…t tax will not a¤ect the optimization behavior of the home and the foreign governments.
12If a government’s concern is only the employment level rather than producer’s surplus, then ¯ can be replaced by the
proportion of a …rm’s domestic employment to its total employment. If a government cares about both employment and
producer’s surplus, then ¯ can be calculated as a weighted sum of the two ratios.
93 Cooperative Governments
If the home and the foreign governments set their environmental regulations cooperatively, they can
choose their output and transfer schemes based on a single report from the representative …rm. The
problem becomes the same as the one where a single principal regulates two production activities. From
equations (9) and (10), the joint welfare function for a given µ is the following:
W + W¤ = V (y;y¤)+V ¤(y;y¤)+¼(y;y¤;µ) (11)
It is easy to see that the joint welfare is independent of the transfers. The intuition is that both
governments assign equal weights to producer’s surplus, consumer’s surplus, and tax revenue so that
any transfer between governments and …rms has no e¤ect on their joint welfare.
As a result, to maximize their joint welfare, the governments can simply choose the output levels
conditional on µ and then make …rms to reveal their true technology parameters by giving them all the
consumer surpluses, V + V ¤, from their production. The separation of the output decision from the





(V (y;y¤)+V ¤(y;y¤)+¼(y;y¤;µ))f(µ)dµ (12)
By the small-countries assumption, price is determined in the international market. Piecewise di¤er-
entiating the integrand with respect to y and y¤, respectively, gives the following …rst order conditions:13
p ¡ Cy ¡ (° + ®°¤)Áy(y;µ)=0 (13)
p ¡ Cy ¡ (°¤ + ®°)Áy(y¤;µ)=0 (14)
where Cy = c1(y + y¤)+c2µ + » and Áy = b1y + b2µ. Cy is the private marginal cost of production for
a …rm with technology µ. This private marginal cost is the same across countries.
The assumptions about the total cost function ensure that ¼ is strictly concave and ¼µ is linear
in y and y¤.S i n c e Á is strictly convex in y and y¤, V + V ¤ + ¼ is strictly concave in y and y¤,s o
13There is no loss of generality here in restricting the analysis to piecewise di¤erentiation as all the functions have second
order derivatives.
10that the …rst order conditions (13) and (14) are necessary and su¢cient for characterizing an optimal
mechanism. It is easy to see that there exists a unique solution to conditions (13) and (14). This set
of output and transfer schemes is feasible as the governments want all …rms to be active and all …rms
are willing to produce in both countries because both the private marginal cost of production and the
marginal disutility of pollution are low at low output levels, while pro…t is still positive at low output
levels. Proposition 1 summarizes these results.
Proposition 1. If the home and foreign governments design their pollution regulation policies cooper-
atively, then equations (13) and (14) give the equilibrium output levels for each …rm. One way to
implement these output levels is to let each multinational …rm be the residual claimants of all the
consumer’s surpluses from its production.
From the …rst order conditions (13) and (14), the equilibrium output in each country is set where
price (p) equals the private marginal cost of production (Cy) plus the home and foreign marginal
disutility of pollution from local production (the third term on the left hand side of the conditions).
The marginal disutility of pollution generated by the last unit of output for all …rms is equalized across
countries in equilibrium as the cooperative governments’ joint objective here is to minimize the total
pollution at any given total output. Since the information cost (i.e. the cost of transfers) of observing
each …rm’s true µ is internalized, the equilibrium output levels are at the …rst-best levels.
Using the …rst order conditions, we can discuss the “pollution haven” hypothesis without solving





° + ®°¤ (15)
If ° ¸ °¤,t h e n° +®°¤ ¸ °¤ +®° so that y · y¤ as b1 > 0. Hence, all …rms produce less in the country
with the higher disutility per unit of pollution unless pollution is perfectly mobile (® =1 ). Although
transboundary pollution reduces the magnitude of production di¤erences between countries compared




°+®°¤, the transboundary pollution
e¤ect by itself cannot reverse the “pollution haven” hypothesis.
In sum, cooperative governments can implement the …rst-best outcome even with asymmetric in-
formation. As predicted by standard theories of the …rst-best, the “pollution haven” hypothesis holds
11with cooperative governments regardless of asymmetric information, that is, a country with lower social
marginal cost of pollution produces less than a country with a higher social marginal cost.
4 Non-Cooperative Governments
In the non-cooperative case, the governments no longer maximize their joint social welfare, so the
transfer schemes a¤ect each government’s welfare independently. Even with symmetric information,
the …rst-best outcome may not be achieved. With asymmetric information, each government wants
to pay fewer information rents to …rms to induce them to reveal their true technology parameters.
Consequently, asymmetric information creates an additional distortion. To understand the nature of this
distortion, it is helpful to know the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome under symmetric information
before discussing that under asymmetric information.
4.1 Symmetric information
When governments know the technology parameters, they can regulate each …rm’s output without
using any transfers. We are back to a two-player non-cooperative Nash game. Hence, the Nash equilib-
rium with symmetric information is given by the solution of the following maximization problems:14
max
y(µ)
W = V (y;y¤;µ)+¯¼(y;y¤;µ) (16)
max
y¤(µ)
W¤ = V ¤(y;y¤;µ)+( 1¡ ¯)¼(y;y¤;µ) (17)
The …rst order conditions are
¯(p ¡ Cy) ¡ °Áy(y;µ)=0 (18)
(1 ¡ ¯)(p ¡ Cy) ¡ °¤Áy(y¤;µ)=0 (19)









14There exists a unique Nash equilibrium as V , V
¤,a n d¼ are strictly concave in y and y
¤.
12It is easy to see that the degree of transboundary pollution (®) has no e¤ect on the equilibrium
output levels under symmetric information as transboundary pollution is completely ignored in each
government’s decision making. The notion of “pollution haven” is the strongest under non-cooperative
governments with full information and equal pro…t shares (¯ = 1
2). However, when pro…ts are distributed
unevenly among the residents in both countries and when ° ¸ °¤, the “pollution haven” hypothesis
breaks down if a su¢ciently large proportion of pro…ts (¯>
°
°+°¤ > 1
2) goes to the home country.15 In
the extreme case, when a multinational …rm originated in the home country repatriates all its pro…ts
in the foreign country (¯ =1 ), then the foreign government would allow zero production (y¤ =0 )a si t
gets no pro…t but pollution.
4.2 Asymmetric information
If the home and the foreign governments separately design their environmental polices and if there
is no sharing of information, then the home government can condition its regulation only on a …rm’s
report made speci…cally to the home government, and likewise for the foreign government.16 The home





)}, is only a function of ^ µ
¤
.
The crucial point of competition under asymmetric information is not about who produces less/more
of the polluting product (as it would be determined by ° and °¤ once a …rm’s µ is revealed), but on
who strategically extracts more information rent from the other through taxing away …rms’ pro…ts.
To provide an intuition about how asymmetric information a¤ects the “pollution haven” hypothesis
through the strategic interaction between governments, let’s consider the following.
In the cooperative case, the governments can implement the …rst-best by making …rms the residual
claimants of consumer’s surpluses so as to provide them the right incentive to reveal their true production
technologies. In this non-cooperative case, each …rm must also receive a non-zero after tax pro…t as
an information rent for revealing its true technology parameter. However, each government has an
15If a government cares about employment, then “pollution haven” hypothesis breaks down if local production signi…-
cantly increases local employment (refer to footnote 12).
16The incentive of collusion between a …rm and a government that discredits any information sharing is discussed later
in this section.
13incentive to levy a higher tax so that each …rm will have a lower retained pro…t and hence less room for
the other government to tax. Furthermore, for a multinational …rm, each government has an additional
incentive to leave less surpluses to …rms because part of these surpluses will contribute to the other
government’s welfare through pro…t sharing. Thus, each government has no incentive to give away any
consumer’s surpluses and every incentive to tax away a bigger proportion of a …rm’s pro…t so as to
squeeze the other government’s tax revenue and to make the other government pay more information
rent to the …rm.
To extract rent from the other government, each government will attempt to induce …rms to produce
less in the other country and hence pay less taxes to the other government.17 If allowed to produce
more in the home country, each …rm will want to produce less in the foreign country as domestic output
and foreign output are perfect substitutes and the total production exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
To cut its output abroad, each …rm has an incentive to report a lower µ to the foreign government.
This forces the foreign government to increase a …rm’s information rent in order to induce truth telling.
The …rm’s retained pro…t is therefore higher, which in turn, relaxes the home government’s incentive
compatibility constraint and allows the home government to levy a higher tax.
Since the (…rst order) bene…t from the increase in tax revenue outweighs the additional (second order)
disutility from more pollution, the home government gains, at the expense of the foreign government, by
implementing a higher output accompanied with a higher tax than those implemented in the absence
of any rent extraction consideration. Of course, the foreign government wants to do the same. In
equilibrium, all regulatory schemes are incentive compatible so that all such attempts are fruitless, but
the possibility of these attempts imposes constraints on the set of equilibrium outcomes and tends to
increase output more in a country with a higher marginal disutility of pollution.
When pollution is transboundary, by increasing its local output to extract information rents, each
government reduces not only its information rent payment to …rms, but also the transboundary pollu-
tion coming from the other country. Although the degree of transboundary pollution by itself has no
e¤ect on the non-cooperative output levels under symmetric information, asymmetric information and
transboundary pollution do reinforce each other in raising the non-cooperative equilibrium output in
17The discussion here has presumed that both output levels and taxes are increasing functions of µ. This presumption
is proved in the appendix.
14the home country more than that in the foreign country, which works against the “pollution haven”
hypothesis.
To prove the above arguments, let’s solve the common agency problem. A …rm’s net pro…t as a
function of the true type and the reported types is:
U(^ µ;^ µ
¤
;µ) , u(y(^ µ);y¤(^ µ
¤
);t(^ µ);t ¤(^ µ
¤
);µ) (21)
In equilibrium, a pair of output functions, {y(^ µ);y¤(^ µ
¤
)}, must be commonly implementable and com-
monly feasible so that U(^ µ;^ µ
¤
;µ) is maximized at ^ µ = ^ µ
¤
= µ.
Applying the trick in Mirrlees (1971) to incorporating a …rm’s incentive compatibility constraints
(details in part 4 of the appendix), the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is given by the solution to the











where ¤ and ¤¤ are de…ned as:
¤(y;µ j y¤) , V + ¼(y;y¤(^ µ
¤
[µ j y]);µ)+t¤(^ µ
¤





[µ j y]);µ) (24)
¤¤(y¤;µj y) , V ¤ + ¼(y(^ µ[µ j y¤]);y¤;µ)+t(^ µ[µ j y¤]) ¡ ¯
1 ¡ F(µ)
f(µ)
¼µ(y(^ µ[µ j y¤]);y¤;µ) (25)
As in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), taking the other’s output and transfer schemes as given, each
government chooses its output scheme to maximize its expected total return (¤ or ¤¤) as discussed
below.
Given that a …rm produces y i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y ,y¤(^ µ
¤
[µ j y]) is the foreign government’s optimal
output scheme and t¤(^ µ
¤
[µ j y]) is the corresponding optimal transfer scheme as a function of its type
µ. ¼µ(y;y¤(^ µ
¤
[µ j y]);µ) gives the increase in pro…t for a …rm with a higher µ but the same output y.





amount of expected information rent to a …rm for it to reveal its true technology µ. A proportion ¯ of
this rent contributes to home welfare because it is a pure transfer from government revenue to domestic
15producer’s surplus. The remaining portion 1 ¡ ¯ of this rent contributes to foreign welfare through
pro…t sharing. Thus, the home government’s total expected net gains (domestic consumer’s surplus
plus total pro…t less taxes paid to the foreign government, V +¼¡(¡t¤)), less the expected information
rent losses, i.e. the part of the expected information rents paid by the home government, but collected




[µ j y]);µ)), gives the home government’s expected
total return (¤). Similarly, the foreign government’s total expected return is given by ¤¤.
Restricting our analysis to di¤erentiable output schemes, the appendix proves that the transfer
schemes are also di¤erentiable (in part 1) and ¤ and ¤¤ are strictly concave in y and y¤, respectively,
and both have an interior maximum (in part 3). The …rst order conditions of (22) and (23) by piecewise
di¤erentiation form a di¤erential system of equations in y and y¤. Given a speci…c initial condition,
part 4 in the appendix proves that there exists a unique solution of y and y¤ as increasing functions of
µ. Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If the home and foreign governments design their pollution regulation policies non-
cooperatively, and if the reduction of marginal cost by using a dirtier technology is greater than the
resulting increase in marginal disutility (i.e. ¡c2 >° ¤b2), then there exists a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium.18 In this equilibrium, the output levels are given by the …rst order conditions of (22)
and (23) and the following boundary condition19
y
0
(µ)=0if ° ¸ °¤: (26)
18If ¡c2 = °
¤b2, then there will be a pooling equilibrium as in Mezzetti (1997). Here, it implies that governments
should just impose a uniform tax on all types of …rms and there will be no need for the governments to screen the …rms.
Asymmetric information becomes irrelevant in this case. If ¡c2 <°
¤b2, then the optimal output should be decreasing in
µ. Under asymmetric information, any output scheme decreasing in µ will not be implementable when the marginal cost of
production decreases in µ,i . e .c2 < 0. This is because y
0
> 0 and y
¤0
> 0 are necessary and su¢cient for implementability
under the single crossing condition ¼yµ = ¡c2 > 0 (Chapter 7, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). Hence, when °
¤b2 > ¡c2 > 0,
the optimal outcome will not be implementable. However, if c2 > 0, then there will be a second-best implementable output
scheme which is decreasing in µ. In this case, the cost e¤ect and the pollution e¤ect both favor a …rm with a lower µ.
There is no real social trade-o¤ between cost reduction and pollution reduction. Hence, this case is not interesting.
19If °<°




(µ)=0 . The boundary condition implies that, for a …rm with type µ,c h e a t i n g
in the neighborhood of its true type will not a¤ect its contracted output level with the home government. Neither will
cheating a¤ect its tax payment to the home government from equation (A.2). Thus, for …rms with µ, all distortions are
concentrated in the foreign country. This boundary condition minimizes the home government’s information rent payment.
16The corresponding transfer schemes are given by (A.2) and (A.3) in the appendix. This set of
output and transfer schemes is implementable and feasible.
From Proposition 2, the non-cooperative equilibrium outcome can be characterized by the …rst order
conditions of (22) and (23). To facilitate the understanding of the rent extraction e¤ect, consider …rst
the case where there is no transboundary pollution, i.e. ® =0 . The …rst order conditions by piecewise
di¤erentiation are:20





c2 + c1y0) (27)










c2+c1y¤0 characterize the strategic e¤ect of a change of government interaction, namely
how a government changes its output so as to a¤ect a …rm’s report to the other government.
Rearranging the above equations and dividing (27) by (28), we have
y






























Condition (29) clearly indicates that output is higher in a country with a higher marginal disutility
of pollution. Besides the common ° and °¤ terms representing the “pollution haven” hypothesis,
condition (30) shows that under non-cooperative governments with asymmetric information, there is
also a pro…t sharing e¤ect captured by the term,
1¡¯
¯ , as in the non-cooperative case with symmetric
20For µ = µ, F(µ)=1and the right hand side of equations (27) and (28) becomes zero. The non-cooperative output is
the same as the cooperative output. The marginal disutility of pollution is also equalized across countries at µ = µ.T h e r e
are no distortions for the most polluting …rms. However, for …rms with µ<µ, the marginal disutility of pollution is likely
to di¤er across countries. Rearranging production can reduce total pollution at any given level of total output. This result















< 0,g i v e n°>°
¤ and c2 < 0.
17information. In both cases, a higher pro…t share leads to a higher output. In addition, the ratio,
c2+c1y¤0
c2+c1y0 ; re‡ects the direct e¤ect of the rent extraction behavior between non-cooperative governments
with asymmetric information. Since both c2 + c1y¤0
and c2 + c1y0 are negative while c1y¤0
and c1y0 are
both positive, the ratio is smaller, the bigger is a “dirtier” …rm’s marginal production increase in the
foreign country relative to that in the home country,
y¤0
y0 , which measures the relative e¤ectiveness of
the home government’s rent extraction behavior to that of the foreign government.
Since the foreign government has a lower marginal disutility of pollution and since a …rm with a
“dirtier” technology has a lower marginal private cost of production, the foreign government is more
willing to assign a higher production to a “dirtier” …rm than the home government, i.e. y¤0
>y 0,w h i c h
can easily be shown by substracting (A.21) from (A.22). This indicates that, compared with the foreign
government, the foreign government’s output scheme is more elastic to the reported µ and hence the
home government is more e¤ective in reducing the foreign government’s output and tax revenue via
a¤ecting a …rm’s reported µ to the foreign government. Thus, the home government is more willing
to increase its production to extract information rent from the foreign government even though the
home government has a higher marginal disutility of pollution. This strategic interaction between non-
cooperative governments with asymmetric information has a direct e¤ect against the “pollution haven”
hypothesis.
If there is some transboundary pollution, so that ® 6=0 , then the …rst order conditions become
p ¡ Cy ¡ °Áy(y;µ)=®°Áy(y¤;µ)
c1y¤0





c2 + c1y0) (31)
p ¡ Cy ¡ °¤Áy(y¤;µ)=®°¤Áy(y;µ)
c1y0





c2 + c1y¤0) (32)
Hence, the strategic interaction between non-cooperative governments with asymmetric information has





c2+c1y¤0, both are negative. Following the previous derivations,
y





















The last fraction term in the above condition re‡ects the additional transboundary pollution e¤ect. If
18y¤0




c2+c1y¤0 > 0.22 Thus, as discussed earlier, transboundary pollution
reinforces the rent extraction behavior in working against the “pollution haven” hypothesis. This is
consistent with the empirical result in Bui (1998) that gain from cooperation is large when there is
severe transboundary pollution.
4.3 Empirical implications
The above results can be extended to cases where unequal weights are assigned to producers and
consumers in each government’s objective function. The restrictions on the cost function can also be
relaxed. The direct and indirect e¤ects of asymmetric information on the “pollution haven” hypothesis
still prevail. However, there will be an addition e¤ect due to the economies or diseconomies of scale.
With these extensions, the results in the paper have two general implications on empirical studies.
First, if time-series data are collected for a particular country, then we will always observe that produc-
tion falls as a country’s marginal disutility of pollution rises. However, if cross-section data are collected
for two or more countries, then we may fail to observe that production is lower in a country with a
higher marginal disutility of pollution as a result of asymmetric information. Second, since di¤erent
…rms can use di¤erent technologies, we need micro-based …rm speci…c data. Aggregate data at the
industry level can be misleading. For an example, Low and Yeats (1992) and Xu (1999) use panel data
at the industry level to test the “pollution haven” hypothesis and reached di¤erent conclusions.
More speci…cally, the major results in this paper can be examined empirically and can enrich the
empirical studies on the “pollution haven” hypothesis. First, the theory suggests that a poorer country
with a lower marginal disutility of pollution should allow dirtier …rms to produce more. Firms can be
ranked in an ascending order according to their revealed output levels and a cleaner …rm would have a
lower ranking. We can then check whether a …rm’s production increases faster in a poorer country than
in a richer country as a …rm’s ranking increases, i.e. whether y¤0
>y 0, as predicted by the model.
Second, if we can estimate the ratio of y¤0
over y0, then we can test the e¤ect of the strategic
interaction between governments with asymmetric information on the relative output levels. The theory





















19predicts that the ratio of y over y¤ should be inversely related to the ratio of y¤0
over y0. The intuition
is that, if °>° ¤, then compared with the foreign government, the home government is more e¤ective
in extracting information rent from the foreign government (i.e. y¤0
>y 0) so that the home government
is more willing to raise its production to exercise rent extraction.
Third, the analysis shows that the rent extraction e¤ect should be stronger when there is transbound-
ary pollution. This result can be tested, for an example, by comparing the acid rain study between two
neighboring countries to that between two countries which are far apart.
In sum, the strategic interaction between governments with asymmetric information suggests that
the output levels in a country should not only depend on that country’s marginal disutility of pollu-
tion, but also depend on that country’s pro…t share, the degree of transboundary pollution, and most
importantly, the increase of marginal production of a “dirtier” …rm that captures governments’ com-
petition in reducing information rents. If we can incorporate these terms into Eskeland and Harrison’s
regression, then we can put the e¤ect of government regulation together with the other private factors
that in‡uence the “pollution haven” hypothesis. If we can observe “pollution havens” after controlling
for all these e¤ects, we can further analyze the signi…cance of each of these factors on the break down
of the “pollution haven” hypothesis.
5 Conclusions and Extensions
This paper develops a common agency model to analyze the strategic interaction between two govern-
ments in regulating polluting multinationals. When the multinational …rms possess private information
about their levels of pollution and the cleanliness of their production technologies, the governments have
to provide incentive schemes for …rms to reveal their true production technology parameters in order to
set the marginal social cost equal to the marginal bene…t of production.
There are three main forces at work. First, each government has an incentive to minimize its
information rent payment to multinationals, which is done by increasing local production so as to
squeeze the other government’s tax revenue. This rent extraction e¤ect is absent under full information
and works against the “pollution haven” hypothesis. Second, the existence of multinational …rms creates
20a pro…t sharing e¤ect. Since after-tax pro…ts are shared between the residents of the two countries,
the strategic interaction between governments with asymmetric information has an indirect e¤ect on
the “pollution haven” hypothesis via sharing …rms’ retained pro…ts as information rents. Third, when
pollution crosses national boundaries, home production imposes an externality on the residents of the
other country, which makes no di¤erence to the “pollution haven” hypothesis in the non-cooperative
full information case as any externality is ignored in each government’s welfare maximization decision.
With asymmetric information, this transboundary pollution e¤ect reinforces the rent extraction e¤ect
and causes another indirect e¤ect of the strategic interaction between governments against the “pollution
haven” hypothesis.
The paper argues that the strategic interaction between governments with asymmetric informa-
tion brings each government an additional marginal social cost of reducing production. This addition
marginal cost comes from the loss of information rent payments to the other government. As a re-
sult, the rent extraction behavior between governments has both direct and indirect e¤ects against the
“pollution haven” hypothesis. The paper suggests that once we control for factors as a result of this
strategic interaction and other private factors that a¤ect a multinational …rm’s production allocation
across countries, we would be able to observe “pollution havens” and evaluate the impact of each of
these factors on the breakdown of the “pollution haven” hypothesis.
As an extension to the theoretical analysis in this paper, it would be interesting to see whether
empirical results support the …ndings in this paper. Although the paper provides some guidelines of
possible empirical studies, such studies are beyond the scope of this paper to carry out an appropriate
test. Also, this paper analyzes the case where a “dirtier” technology is associated with a lower marginal
cost of production. This may not be true in some industries and hence the results in this paper need to
be modi…ed and cannot be applied to those industries directly. Finally, the paper focuses on the adverse
selection problem where the technologies are not in a …rm’s choice set. An extension of this research is
to examine the moral hazard problem where …rms have a choice among a set of technologies both at
home and abroad.
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25Appendix
1. Necessary conditions for common implementability
The incentive compatibility constraints require that the representative …rm’s true technology parameter solves
the …rm’s maximization problem:
max
^ µ;^ µ
















Applying Theorem 12 in Chapter 2 of Hurewicz (1958), quasi-linearity guarantees the existence of a pair of
transfer schemes t(µ) and t¤(µ) which satis…es (A.2) and (A.3) at all points where y and y¤ are di¤erentiable.






























These conditions imply that if a pair of output schemes are commonly implementable, then they cannot be both
decreasing over any interval of £.
If both of the output schemes are nondecreasing, i.e. y
0
¸ 0 and y¤0
¸ 0, then the second order necessary
conditions become
¼yy¤y¤0
+ ¼yµ ¸ 0
¼yy¤y
0





) ¸ 0 (A.4)
Since ¼yµ = ¼y¤µ = ¡c2 > 0 and ¼yy¤ = ¡c1 < 0, all the above three conditions are satis…ed as long as (A.4) holds.
The necessary conditions for implementability are (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) if both output schemes are nondecreasing
26in µ. If one of the schemes is nonincreasing (y
0
· 0) and the other one is nondecreasing (y¤0
¸ 0), then the second
order necessary conditions become ¼yy¤y¤0
+ ¼yµ· 0, ¼yy¤y
0




2. Strategic revelation e¤ects



















. Substituting these equations into U^ µ^ µ and
U^ µ
¤^ µ
¤ derived from equation (A.1) gives








If the monotonicity conditions are satis…ed, i.e. either y
0
> 0 and y¤0
> 0 or y
0
< 0 and y¤0
> 0 for all µ 2 £,
then from the second order necessary conditions derived in Part 1, U^ µ^ µ < 0 and U^ µ
¤^ µ
¤ < 0. U^ µ^ µU^ µ
¤^ µ












. Hence, U(^ µ;^ µ
¤
;µ) is strictly concave in ^ µ and ^ µ
¤
under
the monotonicity conditions and the second order necessary conditions for common implementability.
Given that U(^ µ;^ µ
¤
;µ) is strictly concave in ^ µ and ^ µ
¤
, Theorem 8 in Stole (1992) gives the formulae for the
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Hence, y¤0 @^ µ
¤
@y · 0 and y
0 @^ µ





3. Strict concavity of the objective functions for non-cooperative governments
27Given the incentive compatibility constraints and the assumption that all the cross-partial derivatives are
constant, the second order derivatives of ¤ de…ned by equation (24) and ¤¤ de…ned by equation (25) with respect
to y and y¤, respectively, are the following:























representing the rates of changes of the optimal output with respect to changes of µ, are independent of the
variations of y and y¤ in the process of maximizing the integrand (¤ and ¤¤)a ta n yg i v e nµ. Suppose the
monotonicity conditions are satis…ed so that U(^ µ;^ µ
¤
;µ) is strictly concave in ^ µ and ^ µ
¤

























¼yµ + ¼yy¤y¤0 )=0
Substituting the above expressions into (A.9) and (A.10) gives
¤yy = ¼yy < 0 (A.11)
¤y¤y¤ = ¼y¤y¤ < 0 (A.12)
Hence, ¤(y;µ j y¤) is strictly concave in y and ¤¤(y¤;µj y) is strictly concave in y¤.
4. Properties of the non-cooperative implementable Nash equilibrium
1) First order conditions





(V + ¯¼ ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)t + t¤)f(µ)dµ (A.13)
s:t: (IC) u(y(µ);y¤(µ);µ) ¸ u(y(^ µ);y¤(^ µ
¤
);µ) (A.14)










Following Mirrllees (1971), let U(µ) be a …rm’s indirect utility function. Thus, (IC) implies that U(µ)=
max^ µ;^ µ
¤ u(y(^ µ);y¤(^ µ
¤
);µ)=¼(y(µ);y¤(µ);µ)+t(µ)+t¤(µ). From the envelope theorem, dU
dµ = uµ = ¼µ so
that U(µ)=
R µ
µ uµ(y(s);y¤(s);s)ds + u(µ). Since it is never pro…table for the home government to leave any





Since t = U ¡ ¼ ¡ t¤, the home government’s objective function becomes:















Ignoring monotonicity conditions, the home government’s relaxed problem reduces to the following under the tax









Similarly, we can derive the relaxed problem for the foreign government.
2) Existence and monotonicity
Since ¼yµ = ¼y¤µ, rearranging the …rst order conditions (31) and (32) gives the following system of di¤erential
equations if neither y
0
nor y¤0
is zero. Let Áy = Áy(y;µ) and Áy¤ = Áy(y¤;µ).
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
MCy ¡ ®°Áy¤ +( 1¡ ¯)1¡F
f c2 (1 ¡ ¯)1¡F
f c2 ¡ ®°Áy¤
¯ 1¡F
f c2 ¡ ®°¤Áy MCy¤ ¡ ®°¤Áy + ¯ 1¡F
f c2
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯








¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
MCy ¡ ®°Áy¤ +( 1¡ ¯)1¡F
f c2
MCy¤ ¡ ®°¤Áy + ¯ 1¡F
f c2
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(A.20)
29where
MCy = p ¡ Cy ¡ °(Áy ¡ ®Áy¤)
MCy¤ = p ¡ Cy ¡ °¤(Áy¤ ¡ ®Áy)


























¢=( MCy¤ ¡ ®°¤Áy + ¯
1 ¡ F
f
c2)MCy +( ( 1¡ ¯)
1 ¡ F
f
c2 ¡ ®°Áy¤)MCy¤ (A.23)



















If one of y
0
and y¤0
is zero, for example, y
0
=0 , then …rst order conditions (31) and (32) become















To solve for a de…nite solution to the system of di¤erential equations (31) and (32) in the main text, it is
necessary to impose an initial/boundary condition to pin down a particular solution from a general solution.




From the …rst order conditions, both MCy and MCy¤ cannot be zero for all µ 2 £. Suppose at some µ1 2 £,
MCy jµ=µ1=0 .I fy
0
6=0and y¤0
6=0 , then these assumptions are inconsistent with di¤erential equations (A.21)
and (A.22). If y
0
6=0and y¤0
=0 , then condition (31) implies that (1 ¡ ¯)1¡F
f c2 = ®°Áy¤: Since d
dµ(1¡F
f ) 6=0
and c2 is a constant, y¤0
6=0at µ = µ1. This contradicts the assumption. If y
0
=0 , then (A.24) gives y¤0
= ¡c2
c1
as (1 ¡ ¯)1¡F
















®¯c2. This implies that d
dµ(1¡F
f ) is a constant, which is contrary to the assumption. Therefore,
there exists no µ 2 £ such that MCy =0 . As all functions are continuous, MCy must be either positive or
negative for all µ 2 £. Similarly, MCy¤ must be either positive or negative for all µ 2 £.A sar e s u l t ,¢ 6=0
for all µ 2 £.
Given the boundary condition, y
0
(µ)=0 , from equation (A.25), MCy¤ is positive at µ = µ1 and hence for












MCy is positive at µ and hence for all µ 2 £.
Suppose at some µ2 2 £, MCy¤ ¡ ®°¤Áy + ¯ 1¡F
f c2 jµ=µ2=0 , then (A.21) implies that y
0
(µ2)=0 .E q u a t i o n









This expression for y¤0
(µ2) is inconsistent with condition (A.22) unless µ = µ. Therefore, there exists no µ2 2 [µ;µ)
such that MCy¤ ¡®°¤Áy +¯ 1¡F
f c2 jµ=µ2=0 . Similarly, there exists no µ3 2 £23 such that MCy ¡®°Áy¤ +(1¡
¯)1¡F
f c2 jµ=µ3=0 .
From conditions (A.26) and (A.27),









Hence, MCy ¡®°Áy¤ +(1¡¯)1¡F
f c2 is negative for all µ 2 £.T oe x a m i n et h es i g no fMCy¤ ¡®°¤Áy +¯ 1¡F
f c2,
evaluating condition (32) in the main text at µ = µ gives
p ¡ Cy(y¤;µ) ¡ °¤Áy¤ jµ=µ=0 (A.31)
Totally di¤erentiating (A.31) gives
¡c2 ¡ °¤b2 ¡ (c1 + °¤b1)y¤0
(µ)=0 (A.32)
23MCy ¡ ®°Áy¤ +( 1¡ ¯)1¡F
f Cyµ 6=0even at µ = µ because y¤0
(µ) 6=0 .
31To consider the slope of MCy¤ ¡ ®°¤Áy + ¯ 1¡F
f c2 at µ = µ, substituting condition (A.32) into the derivative of














Since c2 < 0 and d
dµ(1¡F
f ) · 0, the slopes of MCy¤ ¡ ®°¤Áy + ¯ 1¡F
f c2 is positive at µ = µ.G i v e n MCy¤ ¡
®°¤Áy + ¯ 1¡F
f c2 =0at µ = µ, MCy¤ ¡ ®°¤Áy + ¯ 1¡F
f c2 is negative in the left neighborhood of µ and hence for
all µ 2 £.
In sum,
MCy ¡ ®°Áy¤ +( 1¡ ¯)
1 ¡ F
f
c2 < 0 <MC y (A.34)
MCy¤ ¡ ®°¤Áy + ¯
1 ¡ F
f
c2 < 0 <MC y¤ (A.35)
It is then trivial that the Nash equilibrium with boundary condition (A.26) satis…es y
0
> 0, y¤0
> 0, and (A.4).
Since all functions are continuous and have bounded derivatives to the third order, the Lipschitz condition is
satis…ed uniformly. From Theorem 11 and 12 in Chapter 2 of Hurewicz (1958), there exists a unique solution
satisfying (31) and (32) from any initial point (y;y¤;µ) 2 R2
+ £ £ given by boundary condition (A.26). Hence,





Since ¤µ = ¼µ(1¡(1¡¯) d
dµ(1¡F
f )) > 0 and ¤¤
µ = ¼µ(1¡¯ d
dµ(1¡F
f )) > 0, ¤(µ) ¸ 0 if ¤(µ) ¸ 0 and ¤¤(µ) ¸ 0
if ¤¤(µ) ¸ 0. Following the same arguments as those in the cooperative case, all …rms choose to produce in both
countries and both governments allow all existing …rms to operate.
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